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Let Foreign Airlines Fly
Between US Cities
We should follow Europe's example. More competition between airlines
means lower prices.
Friday, September 16, 2016
 David R. Henderson
Economics Air Travel Zoning Protectionism Competition
esterday, over at the "Library of Law and Liberty," Northwestern
University law professor John O. McGinnis had an interesting
post. It's titled "The Obama Administration is Helping Raise Your
Airfares." In it, Professor McGinnis makes the case that the U.S.
airline industry "has become an entrenched oligopoly." He writes:
It is the Obama administration that is accountable. Two years
ago, they permitted the merger of American Airlines and US
Airways, two of the biggest airlines. I generally favor a relatively
relaxed merger policy, because new entry can keep even large
companies from restricting output and raising prices. But it is
very difficult to enter the airline industry, because the take off
and landing slots are limited at airports. And zoning and
environmental regulations make expanding existing airports or
building new ones almost impossle. If you see persistent prices
above the competitive level, search for the government
regulation that causes them.  
But antitrust authorities need to recognize when regulation
impedes new entry and count such a regulatory structure
against permitting such mergers. My suspicion is that the
Obama administration did not do this sufficiently, because the
powerful unions in the industry stood to benefit from a more
oligopolistic structure. If airlines become few enough to
coordinate on price, individual airlines would face less pressure
to cut labor costs. If a merger is permitted when the economics
suggests it should not, search for the powerful interest groups.
Fortunately, there's a solution other than his solution of forcibly
preventing mergers--and it involves less regulation, not more.
But wait. Didn't I just quote him saying that it's hard to expand
existing airports or build new ones? Yes. So I'm advocating letting
existing airports expand and allowing new ones, instead of adding
regulation to make up for existing bad regulation.
But there's another solution that doesn't require any of this: allow
foreign airlines to fly from one U.S. point to another. In other words,
imitate Europe and get rid of the restrictions on cabotage that
European governments abolished in 1997. Their results were great.
Competition increased and airfares fell. Think Ryanair and easyJet.
You might argue that that competition wouldn't matter because the
bottleneck constraints that Professor McGinnis identified are
binding. In other words, goes the argument, another airline entering
wouldn't matter because there wouldn't be access to gates.
But there are two problems with that argument in this context. First,
if it's true, then preventing mergers wouldn't matter either because
the constraint is not the number of airlines but the number of gates.
We know from his post that Professor McGinnis doesn't buy that
argument. Neither do I.
Second, we can't know whether it's true without allowing the new
airlines in. If allowing foreign airlines into U.S. domestic markets
wouldn't reduce fares, we're no worse off. But if allowing foreign
airlines in would reduce fares, then we're better off. And it's easy to
show that in that case, the gains to U.S. consumers would exceed
the loss to U.S. airlines.
And I'm pretty sure that allowing more competitors would increase
competition.
For more on this, see Fred L. Smith, Jr. and Braden Cox, "Airline
Deregulation," in David R. Henderson, ed., The Concise Encyclopedia
of Economics.
A version of this article was first published by EconLog.
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“economic security” for those who are “unwilling to work.”
